TOWARDS RECONCILIATION

CONFRONTING THE PAST AND ACCEPTING ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

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Panel 1 - Reconciliation and Accountability – Theory and Reality

Reconciliation as an Essential Element in Formal Peace Processes
|| Yoav Kapshuk, Tel-Aviv University

Existing conflict and peace research is characterized by a dichotomy between reconciliation and conflict resolution. According to most of this literature, reconciliation is a process or aim to be achieved in the post-conflict period, after or beyond formal peace processes between political leaderships. In keeping with this view, there is a dearth of studies that scrutinize principles of reconciliation in formal peace agreements. This paper aims to fill this gap by referring to various principles of reconciliation as key elements that could be applied in formal agreements to end conflicts. Key reconciliation principles include transitional justice, historical truth, historical acknowledgement, and dealing with the socioeconomic and structural aspects of past injustices. Among these reconciliation principles this paper discusses historical truth in the context of formal peace processes based on several examples from around the world and especially from the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

This paper aims to examine the ways in which reconciliation elements – particularly historical truth - are integrated and documented in formal peace agreements. By scrutinizing several peace agreements from around the world, it shows that this is done in two major approaches: one is general reference to reconciliation principles with a commitment to implement them in the future, and the other is dealing with them within the agreement. In the first approach, for example, the parties agree to deal with the historical truth in the future; the agreement may include a comprehensive plan with a clear timetable for implementing that principle, or may include only a general and ambiguous promise. In the second approach, to follow this example, the truth about the past is described in the agreement itself; if no joint narrative can be agreed upon, the parties at least present their conflicting narratives.

The paper concludes by arguing that integrating reconciliation principles in formal agreements can benefit attempts to end certain conflicts, one of them is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Collective Trauma, Recognition and Reconciliation: The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict in a Comparative Perspective
|| Amal Jamal, Tel Aviv University || Maya Kahanoff, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

The connection between recognition and trauma has remained fundamentally unexplored in the literature dealing with these two issues. Although the subject of trauma has been extensively researched and developed in the field of clinical and social psychology, and the topic of recognition has received much attention in recent decades in philosophy and political thought, no studies have investigated the relationship between the two, in particular with regard to the resolution of ethno-national conflicts and possible reconciliation between groups involved in protracted conflicts.

In this presentation we would like to explore the relationships between trauma, recognition and reconciliation. We will focus on questions concerning the meanings of collective trauma for groups involved in protracted conflicts, and the significance and implications of recognition on the relationships between those groups. Our presentation will be based on theoretical discussions on these issues as well as preliminary findings of our research regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

We will demonstrate the psychological and social implications of collective traumas in an effort to understand their impact on the formation and stubborn persistence of social conflicts. In addition, we will examine the significance of the recognition principle as a means of coping with the paralyzing effects of collective traumas, and suggest it’s potential as a facilitating energy, or a mechanism to promote conflict transformation and reconciliation between groups that have undergone traumatisation.

The lecture presents an opportunity to understand the principles, mechanisms and implications of recognition of collective traumas for dealing constructively with prolonged conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian context.
This paper explores the modes in which two literary works – Marguerite Duras’ Une aussi longue absence (1961) and Albert Camus' La chute (1956) – partake in processes of genuine reconciliation within and without the French collective following the Second World War. Both works have contributed to what historian Dominick LaCapra has called the collective "working through" of the occupation years (1940-1944), a period often referred to as "the dark years" and long regarded as an isolated chapter in France's history. Only during the last four decades have the French agreed to confront this part of their collective past. Indeed, as historian Henry Rousso has pointed out, the Vichy years have now become a veritable obsession in France. Duras' and Camus' works, by contrast, appearing at a very early moment in the working through process, offer a mode of remembrance that relies neither on obsessive memory nor on ignorance or denial, and therefore stands to foster an acceptance of responsibility. Camus' La chute (The Fall) is constructed as a confession by Clamence, a successful lawyer whose life is changed by the experience of witnessing a woman’s fall into the Seine and failing to save her. The work is typically read as a critique of the world's silence in the face of the Holocaust, but it can be interpreted as dealing more specifically with the French relation to the Holocaust. Thus, for example, through an ironic depiction of Clamence's obsessive need to confess, the work criticizes the pursuit of "self-purification" through confession as a solution to complex situations such as the French collaboration. As an alternative, it proposes non-verbal elements that, unlike confession, do not allow for an evasion of a true confrontation with the shameful past, such as a wall from which an image has been removed, laughter that echoes forgotten feelings, and the Jewish quarter in Amsterdam. These elements suggest that reconciliation will have to rely either on space as a material reminder of the crimes, or else on real deeds. Duras' Une aussi longue absence (The Long Absence) describes a meeting between obsessive memory and national amnesia through the literal encounter between the two protagonists, functioning as synecdoches. Thérèse Langlois is convinced that she recognizes her husband, who was deported to concentration camps and did not return, in a vagabond who wonders into her café. The vagabond, for his part, does not recognize her and claims to have lost his memory. The work proposes a narrative that in fact exceeds the dichotomy of precise memory versus forgetting insofar as it demonstrates that neither response is sufficient for accepting responsibility. As in La chute, here too the elements that suggest an alternative direction, one that can develop into genuine reconciliation, are non-verbal, like a joint dance by Thérèse and the vagabond, signifying a possible link between memory and amnesia within the same space. Although Camus and Duras were both Resistance members, their artistic, intellectual, and political trajectories did not converge. Despite the many differences between them, however, their works, I argue in this paper, similarly demonstrate the ability of literature to contribute to national processes of reconciliation, both internal (among the French) and external (vis-à-vis the Jewish victims) through alternative ways of confronting a dark national past.
What does “pure forgiveness” mean? (Derrida 2001 32) Derrida asserts that only the unforgivable crimes, the equivalent of “mortal sin,” (Ibid 32) are in need of being forgiven but what kind of temporal, ethical, historical changes does he imply or advance? On the one hand, Derrida makes it clear that forgiveness must not advance redemption, normalcy, reparations, an ecology of reconciliation or psychological therapy. On the other hand, he asserts that all the above become not only pragmatic solutions but ethical practices, because the concept of forgiveness salvages these procedures from bare utilitarianism and renders them fully humane. Hence it becomes clear that “pure forgiveness” needs practices of reconciliation in order to initiate the conception of ethics beyond ethics in a manner of speaking.

I suggest that in order to give sense to Derrida’s concept of “pure forgiveness” one has to study the time structure, the psychological implications, the ethical argumentation, and the historical study of those unforgiveable crimes as they are examined by survivors and novelists, German and Jews who harbor resentment against both Germany and the culture of forgiveness in general. When one studies the novelist’s or the victim’s resentment one comes in touch with both personal and cultural issues that Derrida does not conceive in his philosophical description of the purity of forgiveness. For example, in order to understand what it means for forgiveness to be eminently personal the reader has to understand that resentment has always been wrongly associated with psychological illness. In fact, resentment and hence forgiveness, too, impose their presence on the psyche in the form of a dream that is strictly subjective and yet desires to be shared with the other so that it becomes eminently intersubjective. The other has to understand the suffering of the victim and her/his own guilt. In addition I argue that Derrida does not specify the time structure of forgiveness but it is the study of resentment that makes it clear that forgiveness inhabits the structure of an anterior future, for resentment demands that the past be changed. If the past could be changed then resentment would be alleviated and thereby usher in the reunion between the victim and the perpetrators. This event comprises a future mutual understanding between the victim and the perpetrator that is based on a newly forged past mutual understanding. Loneliness ceases in the future of forgiveness specifically because resentment enables acknowledgement in and of a past filled with crime and victimization. On the one hand, only if we understand the meaning of resentment will we give recognition to those who signify the unforgivable transgressions and crimes committed under Nazi rule in Germany. On the other hand, only if we understand the ethical burden that resentment shoulders—or what Améry calls “ressentiments”—are we able to also understand what it means for forgiveness to bestow historical practices of reconciliation with ethical meanings.

These goals are addressed by Hans Schnier, the storyteller that Heinrich Böll engages. The narrator speaks to the reader from across the void or from the brink of annihilation. He is very close to death or suicide—be the death cultural, psychological, or physical death. The narrator thinks, speaks, and acts in a culture that is ill-equipped to listen to him and that refuses to unite with this resentful speaker: it is a culture that invests in forgetfulness and reconciliation. The forgetful German culture pretends that democracy requires forgetting and reconciliation. The narrator seems to forge his own hostile audience: a hostile implied reader and a hostile set of characters. The implied reader and the other protagonists in the text make it clear to the narrator that he is mad, that unless he changes his attitude and becomes respectful of culture he will be excluded from it. The resentful narrator shoulders and needs to communicate ethical and psychological positions and affects that the culture in which he speaks and acts willfully represses and denies. The narrator succeeds in making his resentments a limiting case of the possibility to be considered a human being and of the possibility to
substantiate a worthwhile sociability. This means that for him unless resentment is acknowledged, culture amounts to an organized betrayal of everything that is both just and beautiful about the human being. The narrator is one-sided, clearly he is not omniscient, but the fact that culture denies him the right to express his resentment emerges from nothing other than self-indulgence and opportunism. The novelist is able to craft narratives that indict the views that define the post-Second World War European cultures as institutions that churn ignorance for the sake of economic, social, national, and military benefit. Germany is not interested in addressing ethical concerns for it views ethics as opposed to the pragmatism that inheres in useful politicking. The question of how one rehabilitates or gives birth to the human being in the aftermath of the Second World War is the sole concern of the narrator, since only he understand that the concept "never again" has no meaning barring a willingness to contemplate war crimes and to acknowledge the victims of these crimes through accepting responsibility for collaboration with radical evil.

Humanity between Germans and Jews in Romain Gary’s Post War Literature
|| Maya Guez, Tel-Aviv University

The French-Jewish author Romain Gary was a hybrid writer. He combined his passion and admiration for the French Republic with his expression of the Jewish perspective during WWII. Thus, Gary represented, in hiding, Jewish aspects in France via post WWII literature.

There is no doubt that by using a biter-sarcastic tone mixed with black Jewish humor, Gary accused Germans and French for the events of the Holocaust. However, his entire literary arsenal is based upon the idea of peace between groups, even when one of these groups tries to exterminate the other. Moreover, Gary used literature as a demagogical tool that aided him to influence his public of readers and to assimilate uncommon ideas. In fact, by using a popular medium such as a book, he reflected a sea change of view from the common post-WWII literature, and imposed his ideas in a less familiar fashion.

This paper will shed light on the compassion that fills Romain Gary's literary work. By exploring his rhetoric that groups should express brotherhood and forgiveness to one another, he uses metaphors and extra-ordinary hermeneutics of historic events in order to reshape and readapt them into his writings.

Seeking to provide a form of understanding through the historic events, Gary creates a post-WWII environment where the lives of the Jewish survivors contain a presence of their perpetrators. Accordingly, Gary's work as a French diplomat in Bulgaria, the U.N., and Los-Angeles contributed to the language that he used to express a new formula of Humanity.
Panel 3 - Confronting the Past and Realpolitik in South-East Asia

Colonial Past, Popular Resentments and Security - Korea-Japan Relations
|| Joonbum Bae, UCLA

To what degree does widely-held enmity based on historical injustices in formerly colonized countries influence contemporary foreign policy? Does the rise of a common outside threat, for example, dampen animosities amongst the public toward a former aggressor or colonizer, thereby making security cooperation more likely? Or does history trump the needs of a changing security environment? This paper seeks to answer these questions in the context of Korea-Japan relations. China's steep increases in material capability and uncertain intentions toward its neighbors, along with North Korea's provocations and its development of nuclear weapons all seem to point to a convergence of security interests between the Japan and Korea. Moreover, the two countries having common democratic institutions, high levels of economic exchanges, and a shared military ally in the US all seem to point toward the two being natural partners.

Even modest attempts at cooperation in the security arena, however, have been met with fierce resistance amongst the Korean public. This has raised concern within and outside the region about the failure of the two countries to take action in their interest. While pundits have pointed to the legacy of colonial rule, including atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese in the past, as the main reasons behind such hostile opinion and the lack of cooperation between Korea and Japan, this paper investigates the extent to which such animosity based on historical experience trumps the security environment in influencing the Korean public's views of Japan. In order to assess whether the rise of a security threat shifts the public's priorities between perceived historical injustices and the needs of security, this paper compares trends and patterns in Korean public opinion data from 2000 to 2010 with those from the last time the interests of the two countries were closely aligned against a joint security threat: the final years of the Cold War (1986-1991). The existence of surveys during this period that asked the Korean public to rank their sentiments regarding select countries makes this analysis possible.

My analysis reveals that Korean public opinion regarding Japan was not only more positive than previously thought during the latter years of the Cold War, it began to deteriorate only after improvements in the security environment in the latter half of 1988 - when Gorbachev substantively improved relations with South Korea (as well as with the US). Such a negative shift in Korean views of Japan came despite progress in many areas of Korea-Japan relations during the period. This suggests a limit to the extent that "history" trumps security. The paper also analyzes changes at the individual level with a focus on the dynamics of such opinion change and the subsets of the population that were more, or less, resistant to such changes. Prospects for bilateral relations and stability in the region, as well as implications for the role of accountability and apologies in the reconciliation process are discussed in the conclusion.
Divergent Reconciliations and Their Causes: Japan’s Postwar Experience with the United States and China

Rotem Kowner, University of Haifa

The end of a protracted conflict, even a total war, is usually followed by normalization and then by the beginning of a certain form of reconciliation process. Nonetheless, this process, and needless to say its end results, may differ considerably from one case to another, even during the same period or when the same party involved. What are the circumstances and factors that shape the act of reconciliation, its length and intensity? Japan's participation in two lengthy conflicts around the mid-twentieth century (the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-45; the Pacific War, 1941-45) provides an intriguing case study that allows us to examine these questions. With Japan's surrender following the dropping of two atomic bombs on its cities, American benevolent occupation led to a rapid process of reconciliation between the two countries. Seventy years later, the two states still maintain extensive and stable relations that cover every possible domain, ranging from security, economy, to culture. However, with China—Japan's neighbor and other archrival—reconciliation happened much later and less thoroughly, and tensions over the memory of war are increasingly used for political ends. In this presentation I shall examine the American-Japanese and the Sino-Japanese processes of reconciliation and attempt to attribute for the differences between them.

Japan's Avoidance of Assuming Responsibility for the Pacific War

Meron Medzini, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Unlike Germany, which accepted responsibility and atoned for the war in various ways, to this very day Japan refuses to accept full responsibility for launching the Pacific War and even before that for invading China in 1937. There are many reasons for that including: the role of the Emperor in the decision to go to war; the fact that the emperor was not tried as a war criminal; the American policy of rehabilitating Japan as fast as possible and insuring its support in the Cold War; they were not involved in the holocaust, in fact most of the Jews under the Japanese during the war survived; they claimed they were the only ones subjected to Atomic bombs and deserve special treatment; going to war was seen by their leadership as a war crime; war was always seen in Japan as an exalting state and not as a disaster, it was a war to liberate Asia from the White Man’s rule; they claimed they went to war to protect Asia from Soviet Bolshevism; the American's feared that imposing reparations would be destructive to the economic rehabilitation of Japan; those who demanded apologies were mostly on the left and thus angered the American occupation authorities; the Japanese government had to take into account the sentiments of some 5 million Japanese soldiers who served and survived the war; unlike Germany Japan was not divided between the powers; the situation in the Far East after 1945, mainly the fall of Nationalist China and since 1950 the Korean War, required the support of a conservative Japan; the main argument of their wartime leaders as expressed during their trial was – we did what any other nation would have done given our situation. The paper will look into the abovementioned issues.
Historical Accountability in the Sino-American Cold War

Historical accountability played a central role in creating and sustaining Sino-American conflict during the Cold War. The new generation of Chinese leaders that emerged in the early twentieth century felt keenly China's decades of victimization at the hands of Western imperialist nations, experiences that led many of them to adopt a mode of thought and action that highlighted the crimes that these nations had perpetrated on the world. The emerging Chinese Communist government styled itself as the champion of other victimized peoples suffering at the hands of a new global imperialism driven by the United States. Washington's interventions in China, Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam, and other nations of the developing world, Chinese officials felt, required not only a rigid and persistent condemnation of American wrongdoing, but also a military, diplomatic, and economic program to force the United States to acknowledge the illegal and inappropriate nature of its international actions. Throughout the Cold War, Washington strenuously rejected these accusations, and countered that questions of historical blame should be set aside for the sake of constructive forward movement to resolve current problems. Thus the Nixon administration did not think that Washington's spurning of the 1954 Geneva Accords should prejudice efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in either Korea or Vietnam. Similarly, however Washington became Taiwan's defender, this should not prevent steps to achieve peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. As it pertained to questions of historical accountability, Sino-American rapprochement and normalization during the 1970s represented a mutual accommodation by which Washington granted to Beijing much of the substance of its demands – particularly troop withdrawals and related actions throughout East Asia – without Washington ever publicly or privately acknowledging guilt for its past actions.

Panel 4 - Internal Conflicts, Transitional Justice and Reparations

The Ambivalence of Forgiveness - South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission

South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has become something of a model for the world. In Latin America and Africa the TRC process has been emulated to varying degrees of success. Post conflict environments in Europe have invoked the TRC model. Even in the United States people have proposed truth commissions for events ranging from slavery to the Bush administration’s torture policies. And in many ways the TRC was a remarkable thing that represented South Africa’s transition from the long years of draconian apartheid rule to non- or (perhaps more accurately) multi-racial democracy. Yet the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, for all of the good that it did, was far from perfect and among South Africans and close observers it engendered considerable ambivalence. This chapter will investigate South Africa’s TRC with particular attention to two former security force officials who had long haunted South Africans who opposed Apartheid, Dirk Coetzee and Eugene de Kock but who turned on their former colleagues and provided invaluable evidence that helped crack the code of silence that dominated the security forces and government. South Africa’s TRC was vital to the country’s transformation, but it was no panacea, a point that is crucial to understanding not only South Africa’s era of transition, but also for addressing ongoing and future post-conflict environments.
Reparations in Brazil – A Different Path to Accountability in South America’s Transitional Justice

|| Marcelo Torelly, University of Brasilia

Most of the literature regarding transitional justice in South America tends to focus on truth and justice. Argentinean leading case, combining the creation of a truth commission and the prosecution of former regime high officials just after transition produced a precedent that scholars tend to adopt as a model when addressing other neighboring countries. In this perspective, the Chilean process seems to almost fit the model, as both a TC and prosecutions happened, but in a delayed time. But Brazil simple doesn’t match. While the other two countries were searching for truth and establishing criminal trials, Brazil was putting together the biggest program of reparations in Latin America, which costs more than one billion American dollars up to 2014. This paper addresses how reparations became the lynchpin of transitional justice in Brazil and what are the consequences of this process. It argues that while Argentina have had a transition by rupture, and Chile's military rule ended after the regime was defeated in a national plebiscite, Brazilian authoritarian government has been able to control the democratization process, leading to a scenario where struggles for truth and justice face substantive challenges. In this context, the combination of an amnesty law (issued in 1979) with the inclusion of a provision in the new democratic constitution (1988) for reparation to those 'amnestied' allow the reparations program to concentrate most of the post-atrocity transitional justice institutional initiatives. The creation of two federal commissions to implement the constitutional provision –the Special Commission on Deaths and Disappearances (1995-2007) and the Amnesty Commission (2002-today) allow substantive developments. Following and unusual path, those commissions have recognized human rights violations in order to provide moral and economic redress, while in Argentina and Chile reparatory provisions follow the work of a truth commission. Ending the ‘state of denial’ regarding the violations, the commissions legitimize the victims historical claims, amplify social awareness of past wrongdoing, and incidentally leverage the struggle for truth and justice. Even if the original intention wasn’t that, the commissions catalyze social struggles for accountability challenging the boundaries of the controlled transition. The creation of a National Truth Commission (NTC) almost three decades after the end of military rule, overcoming huge obstacle crafted by former regime supporters, appear as a huge surprised for those who contrast Brazil with Argentina and Chile, but seems as a natural development when the distinctive path is taken into account. How this distinctive path influence the work of the NTC and prospects for accountability are some of the questions to be addressed in the full paper. The only way to understand Brazil's late transitional justice institutional efforts is focusing how civil society and democratic policy makers have been able to use reparations to challenge impunity and oblivion.
Amnesty but Not Amnesia: Dilemmas of the Reconciliation with the Communist Past in Poland

Leszek Koczanowicz, Wroclaw Faculty of the University of the Social Sciences and Humanities

After 25 years of the democratic transformation Communist past is still a hot politically issue in Poland. Drawing on my book Politics of Time. Dynamics of Identity in Post-Communist Poland (2008) I intend to show the dilemmas of the relation to the Past in Polish political and cultural discussions. ‘Amnesty but not Amnesia’ is a quote from Adam Michnik a political dissident during Communist times and in democratic Poland an editor of Gazeta Wyborcza the influential daily. He insists that the past should be remembered but criminal justice should not be employed with dealing with the former communist. However some critics of his position claim that the unfinished settlement with the communist past has hindered the process of transformation. In my presentation I will show the arguments of both sides in the dispute as well as its cultural and political background.

Thursday - 4.6

Panel 5 - In the Shadow of the Holocaust

Ghosts of the Holocaust in Franco’s Mass Graves

Natan Sznaider, Academic College of Tel-Aviv-Yafo

If, in legal terms, crimes against humanity is not subject to a statute of limitations, in moral and political terms it is characterized by its validity and operation, by its constant posing of questions to the present. The dead now speak through a third generation, and become powerful signifiers in contemporary society. But this metanarrative of trauma and victimhood opens new rifts in the political sphere, as the category of victim is particularly open to contradiction and fierce debate specially in a post-civil war society. I will look at these processes through the lenses of Spain and Argentina. I want to analyze what is known in Spain as the “recovery of historical memory”, as well as the politics deriving from it. This process was catalyzed by the exhumations of the remains of victims of Francoism that have been under way since the beginning of the twenty-first century. I will show how ghosts of the Holocaust haunt Spanish memory politics and become representational tropes and interpretative paradigms for many other cases in and outside of Europe.

We are facing a new pattern of memory in which the moral, the legal, and the political are constantly being fused. As in Argentina, the discovery of the victims and testimonies that reveal the fate of the disappeared and the nature of the crimes inform a new memory narrative, in which law displaces war as a lens for interpreting the events. The past is not interpreted in terms of a civil war that calls for “reconciliation” and “starting a new chapter.” The imperative of remembrance is now linked with the unique nature of the crimes—fundamentally imprescriptible, unaffected by any statute of limitations—meaning framed by Holocaust memory.
Coming to Terms with the Jewish Past in Contemporary Poland
|| Yifat Gutman, Tel Aviv University

In the 1980s a new interest in Poland's pre-war Jewish population gained prominence among the younger, second generation as an anti-communist activity. In the recent decade a second wave of Polish commemoration of the Jewish past has emerged, becoming especially visible since 2006. This wave is carried out by Polish NGOs and artists from the third generation since the War, who, responding to a different global and European context and discourse about addressing the Holocaust and genocides, seek to acknowledge and denounce Polish aggression against Jews. They do so by remembering the multicultural past in one of today's most homogeneous societies with the aim of including the history of Polish Jews in Poland's national identity. The rhetoric of multiculturalism does not always reflect the activists' more radical views about Polish acknowledgment of past wrongs, which corresponds to globally circulating discourses on reconciliation through coming to terms with the past. Moreover, the local activities of these "memory activists" (Gutman 2011) in former Jewish towns (Shtetls) and cities around the country are contested and often meet denial and suspicion by local residents. However, I argue that the rhetoric of reclaiming the multicultural past that was erased by the different occupying powers is the only available discourse that enables inclusion of pre-war populations—primarily Jewish, but also Orthodox, German, and Roma—that are excluded from public debate and political discourse. It also offers a different conversation on the Jewish past with local residents of former Shtetls, who since the early 2000s, are often represented in Polish public debate as the bearers of the blame for atrocities against Polish Jews during and after WWII. The paper is part of a larger research project that examines the impact and implementation of globally circulating expert-based discourses of reconciliation through addressing a difficult past on public debate and political discourse in post conflict societies (Poland and the Sudetenland) in comparison to cases of active conflict (Israel-Palestine).

Expressing Remorse for the Holocaust in Slovakia: A Historical Perspective
|| Hana Kubátová, Charles University

Jozef Lettrich, chairman of the Slovak National Council, the main administrative body in Slovakia, received in March 1946 a letter from organizations representing the Jewish minority in the country. They once again urged the official places to adopt a restitution law and return Jewish property stolen during the existence of the authoritarian wartime state. In this letter, more than in other correspondence addressed by those speaking on behalf of the Jews of Slovakia to the country's leadership in Bratislava, representatives of the diminished Jewish community made a clear link between accepting historical responsibility, correcting past wrongs and possible reconciliation. As there is no doubt those who enriched themselves by Jewish belongings were majority Slovaks and as it was the Slovak government who enforced discrimination, stood in the letter, "it is more than morally justifiable and the honor of the Slovak nation requires that injustices wrought by the Slovak government are restored by the Slovak National Council."

If adopting a restitution took this long – being finally approved in May 1946, a year after the end of the Second World War in Europe and a year after a presidential decree enabled the return of looted property in the Czech lands – it was only the beginning of accepting responsibility for past crimes in Slovakia. Mainly a result of the Slovak National Uprising, an armed rebellion against the Nazis and the collaborating regime in the country that took place in late summer 1944, postwar Slovakia joined victorious powers as part of the renewed Czechoslovak republic. Memorial plaques erected later by the Communist regime transformed victims of 1938-1945 into anti-fascist fighters and the war into a
class a struggle. Annual commemorations of the Slovak National Uprising glorified resistance, courage and heroic acts of those fighting on the so-called Communist side. There was only limited space for Jews in the resistance narrative and what happened to the Jews played little role in the official interpretation of the war. Marginalization was, however, not replaced by silence. My paper explores this twisted road in accepting responsibility for crimes of the wartime nondemocratic regime in a large historical perspective of 1948-1989. Focus is given on a critical reevaluation of events that took place in 1987, marking the 45th anniversary of first deportations of Jews from Slovakia. Following commemorative acts in Yad Vashem, Jerusalem or the Simon Wiesenthal Center, Los Angeles a group of Slovak intellectuals published a declaration condemning the deportations and expressing remorse for crimes committed against Jews in Slovakia. The 1987 declaration was frantically rejected by official Czechoslovak places as foreign propaganda, claiming “the Slovak nation is not responsible for this or the other crimes of the fascist government and has no reason at all to beg other nations for forgiveness.” Three years later, following the fall of the Communist regime, it became the basis for the Declaration on the Deportation of Jews from Slovakia to Concentration Camps in 1942 and 1944, issued jointly by the Slovak Parliament and the Slovak government.

Vengeance vs. Enlightenment: the Nuremberg Legacy and Post-Atrocity Justice
|| Renana Keydar, Stanford University

The International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, established by the Allies at the end of the Second World War, marked a historic watershed in humanity’s quest for justice in the aftermath of war and mass atrocity. Bringing the atrocities of the Nazis into the courtroom and creating new legal categories that rendered them punishable, the trial transformed the vocabulary and the horizon of expectations of international criminal justice.

The decision to bring the Nazis into the courtroom was hailed by the tribunal’s architects as a victory of the values of Enlightenment - the reign of reason, the betterment of humanity and the progress of civilization - over barbaric desires for revenge, mainly the widespread calls to summarily execute Nazi leaders. According to the American-driven binary view, it was the fact that the trial was taking place, more than anything else that it would set to prove and determine, that marked the moral superiority of the new civilized order. Shying away from state-sponsored revenge and even legal retribution, in favor of an enterprise of civilization and education was deemed a key component in restoring order and promoting reconciliation.

My paper examines the Nuremberg legacy’s underlying (false?) binary of enlightenment vs. revenge through the intersection of law and the humanities. As my paper shows, cultural narratives of past and present challenge the dichotomic view constructed by the trial’s visionaries and probe the marginalization of revenge and retribution in the process of accountability for atrocity.

Reading the trial narratives in conjunction with works by British writer and journalist Rebecca West, Jewish-German thinker Hannah Arendt and Hollywood film director Quentin Tarantino in his film Inglourious Basterds, the paper highlights the unresolved nature of justice that was shaped in Nuremberg and continues to influence contemporary debates searching for the adequate response to crimes of mass atrocity.
Panel 6 - Denial versus Penitence and Remorse-Theological and Political Perspectives

Individual and Collective Dimensions of the German-Polish Reconciliation
|| Urszula Pękala, Leibniz Institute of European History

Since the Christian theological interpretation of reconciliation focuses, first and foremost, on what happens between individuals, the question arises of how to deal with this concept if its scope is expanded to include entire societies. It is important to consider the question of personal guilt, responsibility, repentance, and the readiness to forgive, especially when initiatives of reconciliation – as it was in the case of the German-French and German-Polish context after WWII – are promoted by those who are not guilty of the crimes to be atoned for. Moreover, the efforts of reconciliation also extend to those generations that did not immediately experience the war.

This raises several questions, which touch upon the issue of accountability in reconciliation in political contexts:

- To what extent can a collective (a Church community, society, a political group, or a nation) participate in a gesture of reconciliation offered by an individual or an assembly?

- What justifies the necessity of granting, and accepting, a gesture of reconciliation offered by dignitaries or organizations of the Church?

- What is the political significance of such gestures and how compulsory are they for the members of the Church and society in general?

- What is the significance of such gestures for following generations who neither experienced the war nor witnessed the past events on the way towards reconciliation?

The paper discusses these questions as exemplified by selected events form the German-French and German-Polish reconciliation after WWII on the level of the Catholic Church, drawing form approaches of systematic theology and Church history. One of these examples is the correspondence between Polish and German Catholic bishops in 1965, which demonstrates how a reconciliation gesture made by particular group – here the Catholic episcopates – on the one hand involves the issue of representation/participation of its contemporaries, and on the other hand affects following generations. At the time when the correspondence took place, it raised heavy discussions within the Church and in the society about bishops’ authorization to speak on behalf of their nations. Additionally, in the GDR and Poland it resulted in repressions against the bishops by the communist regime. Nowadays, in Germany and Poland the correspondence is regarded – both within the Church and in political circles – as the milestone of German-Polish reconciliation. What is more, the after-war generations refer to the correspondence from 1965 as to a model of reconciliation, also apart from the German-Polish context. Recently did it the Ukrainian president Petro Poroschenko in his speech in Polish parliament when he talked about the Ukrainian-Polish relationship.
German-Israeli Reconciliation between Peoples and between States: Unique or Indicative?
|| Lily Gardner-Feldman, Johns Hopkins University

The remarkable German-Israeli rapprochement after the Holocaust has been termed a "special relationship," suggesting that its features and evolution are unique in light of history. However, from its inception this improbable friendship has been set in a broader framework of German foreign policy.

After World War II and the Holocaust, Germany had an existential need to be rehabilitated, to return to the "family of nations," to transform itself from the status of pariah state to one that was accepted and respected in the international realm and deserved the exercise of full sovereignty. Seventy years after World War II, Germany is a revered and emulated member of the international community. One of the chief vehicles for this conversion has been Germany’s foreign policy of reconciliation, its willingness to assume responsibility for the past vis-à-vis its former victims.

In the immediate post-war period, Germany focused its reconciliation efforts on building new relations with France and with Israel. Germany was joined in the work of reconciliation by willing partners for both moral and pragmatic reasons. In both cases, civil society actors frequently initiated ties, with governments subsequently consolidating and institutionalizing relations. In many instances, path-breaking initiatives were taken by the victims. After the end of the Cold War, Germany extended its foreign policy of reconciliation to Poland and to Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic to complete the scope of dealing with the past and to contribute to the shaping of a new Europe. The various processes of reconciliation have not entailed the creation of harmony, but rather the development of institutionalized fora for the painful and contentious examination of the past and for the airing of contemporary differences.

Within this overall framework, the paper examines the motives, nature, leaders, context and institutions of societal and governmental reconciliation between Germans and Israelis to gauge how different the German-Israeli relationship is from other examples of Germany’s foreign policy of reconciliation. It also examines whether there are lessons from the multi-level German-Israeli example for other cases of dealing with the past, such as that between Japan and its former enemies in East Asia.
Panel 7 - Conflicting Narratives, Diplomacy and Reconciliation

Generation War: A New Version of the Old German Narrative “We-Suffered-Too”
|| Annette Vowinckel, Humboldt University Berlin

In March 2013, the miniseries Generation War (Unsere Mütter, unsere Väter) was first broadcast on German public television. It won several awards in Germany (including Deutscher Fernsehpreis and Goldene Kamera) as well as an Emmy Award (category: mini-series) in the United States. The plot was praised as “courageous” and “authentic”, and only very few German critics—including historians Ulrich Herbert and Christoph Classen—drew attention to the fact that the plot was highly constructed and that the central message equaled the German “we-suffered-too” narrative, which had been predominant since the 1950s.

In Poland, Israel, and the United States in turn, the series was received rather critically. The fact that in the film a German Jew (Viktor Goldstein) survives the war in order to reunite with his Gentile friends in Berlin in 1945 seems—according to Ha’Aretz—unlikely at best. Polish critics complained about the depiction of Polish guerilla fighters who seem more radically anti-Semitic than the Germans. Reception in the US was not as critical as in Poland and Israel, but did not match the enthusiastic German reception either. Yet despite critical reflections in the New York Times and Washington Post the film won an Emmy Award in November 2014.

I will argue, first, that the Emmy was not related to a critical debate of the Nazi past—let alone a contribution to the reconciliation between Germans and Jews—but rather a side-effect of the “Netflixization” of the Nazi past. Second, I will debate whether the history of National Socialism and the Holocaust is shifting from the realm of the historical witness to the realm of fiction (that is, to be sure, fiction as opposed to docudrama). Finally, I will ask why the German “we-suffered-too” narrative has again become predominant in recent productions like Generation War, Dresden, or March of Millions. My hypothesis is that this phenomenon is closely linked both to the “Netflixization” of history and the transformation of the witness to a semi-fictional storyteller. As an attempt to promote the understanding of “ordinary Nazis” all films mentioned above may have been successful in Germany. Yet they will surely not enhance the process of reconciliation between Germany and Israel, Poland, or Jewish Communities in the United States.

Dual Narrative Approach to History - Education as a First Step toward Reconciliation: An Israeli Palestinian Project
|| Eyal Naveh, Tel Aviv University

From 2000 until 2010 a group of Israeli and Palestinian history teachers heading by two historians, gathered in order to try and write a common history textbook for their respective societies. Struck by how different the standard Israel and Palestinian textbook histories of the same events were from one another, they began to explore how a new understanding of history itself might open up different kind of dialogue in an increasingly violent and hostile climate. After failing in their attempt to write a common narrative, they moved to a "dual narrative" approach that will place the different Israeli and the Palestinian historical narratives next to each other. It resulted in a book that comprised the history of the two people, in separate narratives set literally side by side so that readers and students can track each against the other, noting both where they differ as well as where the correspond. Characterized as a successful failure, the paper will first describe the process of that a unique project, focusing on the product and its international impact, as well as its failure to be implemented in Israel and Palestine.
Following this account the paper will analyze the need and the significance of a dual narrative approach in societies that are still in the mid of an intractable conflict. The main argument of the paper will demonstrate the advantage of such an approach that can help each side to familiarize itself with the narrative of the other as a necessary prerequisite for further recognition.

The group could not avoid dealing with the difficult topic of violence, since the history of the conflict is full of violence, but on the other hand, it had a goal to temper its impact in order to promote mutual understanding a beginning of reconciliation. The paper will explore and analyze the ways that the group dealt with writing on violence and how it finally appeared in a different manner in the written respective narratives. It will also interpret the apparent dissimilarity between the Israeli and Palestinian versions, as a reflection of the different stage of historical literacy as well as the disparate political status of both societies.

Mediators, Memory and Political Reconciliation: Narrating the Past in Cambodia and Yugoslavia after the Cold War
|| Chen Kertcher, Tel Aviv University

After the Cold War the Balkans and South East Asia were unstable regions that received special attention from the international community. The paper focus on the work of mediators on national memory issues during the late 1980s and early 1990s in Cambodia and Yugoslavia. The paper examines how mediators tried to manipulate memories of past grievances by acknowledging that remembrance is a conscious political practice which could lead to reconciliation or to renewal of violent conflict.

In Cambodia, mediators toiled to end the long civil war by reconciling the differences between four Khmer factions in order to form a comprehensive peace agreement. One of the barriers for signing the agreement was how to treat the two most powerful Communist factions during the transition period from a civil war up to the establishment of a democratic government. The Khmer Rouge was responsible for democide of a quarter of Cambodia’s population during the mid-1970s. The puppet government of the RPK, that was establish under the Vietnamese occupation of the country, was responsible for gross human rights abuses and the settlement of a large Vietnamese minority in Cambodia which posed a threat to Khmer national identity. The decision of how to treat these memories was a crucial part in ending the civil war and for the establishment of democracy in the country.

In Yugoslavia the mediators had to confront nationalist leaders who wanted to transform Yugoslavia from a Communist federative polity into a Serbian dominant country or to break the country into different national units. The rising tensions between the different national camps drove the country into a series of civil wars that lasted through the 1990s. From the beginning of the national strife nationalists leaders such as the Serb Slobodan Milosevic and the Croat Franjo Tudjman used past grievances in order to bolster their national support against other national groups. The mediators tried to tone down the nationalistic rhetoric by encouraging the parties to adopt different narratives of the past in the hope that it will assist in maintaining Yugoslavia intact.

In both cases national memory served as a two edge sword; first, for ending and preventing conflicts and second, in support for the renewal or inflammation of conflicts. The professional mediators pressed the conflicted faction leaders to adopt historical narratives that were in congruence with their reconciliation efforts. In parallel, the mediators’ initiatives were manipulated by all factions that used memory as a tool to achieve their political goals.